Analysis of Reasons why Han Chinese Officials were not given an Important Role in the Government of Kublai

ABSTRACT

In the reign of Kublai Khan from 1260A.D. to 1294A.D, favorable policies for China, including regular taxation system, population growth policy, and policy to promote agriculture, were widely imposed by the government of Mongol Empire in China. However, unlike Semu (people from Central Asia, Western Asia, and Europe) minsters, Han Chinese officials were not trusted by Kublai to hold important positions. In this article, I will use Persian and Chinese sources to attempt to find out why Kublai was conservative in appointing Han Chinese officials to organize his territory in China. I concluded three major reasons: the encouragement of commerce, Kublai’s fear of Han Chinese rebellion, and pressure from Mongol nobles.

KEYWORDS

Mongol empire; Yuan dynasty; ethnic policy; Kublai Khan; conquest dynasties; Confucianism; sinicization

INTRODUCTION

Kublai Khan, governing the empire from 1260A.D. to 1294A.D., was the fifth Khan of Mongol Empire, as well as the first emperor of the Yuan Dynasty in China. In his reign, Kublai promoted policies towards the Chinese including a regular taxation system, population growth policy, and a policy to promote agriculture. At the same time, Han Chinese people were dominant in the government at the early stage of Kublai’s reign. However, these officials were then not trusted by Kublai and were therefore unable to hold important positions in his government. Recent scholarship has failed to provide convincing explanations for why Han Chinese were not included in the Mongolian administration in the later years. Understanding this, nevertheless, is critical if we are to comprehend the long-term loss of legitimacy of the Yuan government and why the Yuan ultimately was not able to sustain power in China. I will argue that Kublai Khan was not able to promote Han Chinese to high positions because he failed to balance and control the competing demands of Han officials and those in the Mongol elite, and eventually he surrendered to the demands of the Mongol elites. This was because Mongol nobles added to pressure on Kublai to enforce him to alienate from Han Chinese officials; Kublai encouraged commerce, which was opposed by Han Chinese officials; Kublai was afraid of Han Chinese rebellions after giving their officials to much power.

Current scholarship on Mongolian studies has broadened cultural and ethnic understanding of Mongolia, in such works as Peter Jackson’s The Mongols and the Islamic World, but the literature in English has often failed to include ethnic policies towards the Han Chinese. Likewise, Morris Rossabi mentions social and economic policies that were beneficial for Han Chinese subjects, but he fails to make the distinction with political promotions.[1] Chinese scholars have offered an overly culture-based analysis, seeing ethnic discrimination as the motivation, which may be anachronistic. For instance, Liangxiao Zhou states that Mongol rulers had their instinctive ethnic bias and discrimination when ruling the empire.2 Even if such discrimination did emerge, it is not a satisfactorily explanatory factor. This essay, therefore, fits into recent scholarship on “racism” or “ethnic discrimination,” which looks for causal factors, often to do with competition for resources, that have led to discrimination emerging. I’m also working with the context of the wide-ranging scholarship that tries to understand why the Mongols were able to create great unities across Asia of varying durations. Timothy May3 and Peter Turchin4 were two scholars whose works were important to this research. The research of Qiqing Xiao is also recognized in this paper. He encouraged the study of the ethnic system in the Mongolian and Yuan Dynasties from the perspective of political interests.5 Although his research did not focus on Kublai Khan’s period, this paper is still inspired by his idea that political interests, instead of ethnic discrimination, are the key of studying ethnic policy of Mongol Empire.

  1. Pressure from Mongol nobles

Kublai Khan’s alienation from Han Chinese was also the outcome of Mongol nobles’ pressure on him. The behavior of the king in Mongol Empire was affected, or restricted, by nobles.6 Unfortunately, Mongol nobles wanted to suppress Han Chinese. Zhou Liangxiao said that “behind Kublai was a number of Mongol nobles who lived separately on the grassland, supported Mongol traditions, and opposed Confucianism.”7 Mongol nobles believed that their own traditions were superiors to the ones of subject people.

Nobles regarded Han Chinese and their culture, especially Confucianism, as threats. In other words, they did not want Han Chinese to become dominant in politics and culture. Hence, Yuan’s ethnic policy was not designed to achieve the harmony and unity between different ethnic groups. In fact, it aimed to suppress and separate subject people from a political and cultural perspective.8

Kublai tried to get rid of the control of Mongol nobles. In the first years of his reign, he showed obvious pro-Han tendencies. However, his pro-Han behaviors were utilized by Mongol nobles on the grassland to rebel against his government. Kaidu, the son of Ogodei, wanted to get the throne from Kublai. He told other nobles on the grassland that Kublai’s Chinese policies would threaten their privileges. In doing so, he earned the support of a number of nobles. Kaidu’s rebellion was a huge strike for Kublai. He knew that Kaidu’s major goal of rebellion was to gain the throne. However, he also realized the potential harm of trusting in Han Chinese officials.

The interference of Mongol nobles continued to influence Kublai’s policies toward Han officials after Kaidu’s rebellion in two ways. First, they attempted to pressure Kublai to provide imperial exams for Han Chinese because the imperial test gave Han Chinese a chance to gain positions in the government and therefore expand their political influence.9 Moreover, they required Kublai to support Semu officials who could increase the revenue of nobles through financial means and suppress Han Chinese officials who supported Confucianism that brought no benefit to nobles.10

Kublai first expected the imperial examinations to be held, because he was originally willing to integrate with the traditional Chinese ruling system According to the description in Yuan Shi, Kublai ordered accountable officials to hold the examination, but the plan was forced to stop.11 Yuan Shi did not point out the reason why the plan “was forced to stop,” but it was certain that nobles played a role in it. After this, Kublai tried three times for the examination but all failed.12Yelu Chucai, a supporter of the imperial examinations, wrote a poem to complain that if the imperial exam could not be carried out, the current flawed political situation can not be changed only by the existing policies. One of the sentences of his poem was “Outdated tradition is not able to solve new problems, and excessive faculties are not able to eliminate long-standing maladies.”13 However, Yelu Chucai’s dream was never realized until the governance of Ayurparibhadra, a khan who respected Chinese culture and policy more than Kublai.14 However, less than a thousand officials were provided for the government though examinations in his reign. It was a number that could be ignored.15 Because Han Chinese could not take the exam and enter the government, they were gradually marginalized by the government.

Mongol nobles also exerted pressure on Kublai Khan to force him to favor the Semu side in the competition between Han Chinese officials and Semu officials. In Kublai’s reign, these two groups of officials held different ideologies about administration. For Han Chinese, they regarded Confucianism as the best way to operate a country that was mainly composed of peasants. Oppositely, Semu officials asserted that the most effective way to run a massive empire was through continuously producing benefits through economical means. Kublai adopted the views of both sides and hoped that these two sides of officials would form a balance of power. However, only Semu officials’ policies could have a positive impact on them. Under the operation mode of the Mongol Emp[2]ire, the central government collected trade tax from all over the country and distributed the revenue to nobles everywhere.16 Therefore, nobles could increase their incomes by encouraging trade, and since Semu officials always made efforts to promote commerce, almost all the nobles supported them. Oppositely, Confucianism supported by Han Chinese officials could not bring any concrete benefit to nobles.17 What was more, Han Chinese officials tried to stop Semu officials from implementing financial management methods. Yelu Chucai, for example, once accused Abd al-Rahman, a Semu official, hat “his tricks were all imposed by treacherous ministers who lied to the emperor and suppresed common people. They[3]will cause disastrous harm to the nation, so I demand repealing these laws.”18  Yelu Chucai’s remark encouraged more Han Chinese officials to oppose to financial management methods. Seeing that Han Chinese officials were trying to stop them from gaining more profits, Mongol nobles forced Kublai to alienate Han Chinese officials in the government. Under the pressure from Mongol nobles, Kublai stopped his reliance on Han Chinese officials and appointed more Semu officials to fill the gap, which made it difficult for Han Chinese to compete with Semu people and hold important positions in the government.

  1. Encouragement of commerce

The Khans of Mongol Empire, especially Kublai, encouraged commerce as a main source of government revenue along with agriculture. The relative status between agriculture and commerce changed by time and reigns of different khans.19 In Kublai’s time, commerce was put in an extremely important position because commerce could provide income to support his wars and reconstructions.20 More importantly, commerce had been widely and deeply accepted among Mongol nobles and governors by the time they conquered sedentary nations in China. 21 As a result, no matter what social ranking they belonged to, Mongolians had formed a tradition of encouraging commerce and expecting commerce to thrive in their tribes and empires. Therefore, commerce, apart from agriculture, became the first option for Kublai.

That Han Chinese officials competing with pro-commerce Semu officials started from Ogodei. Yelu Chucai, a sinicized official, was once the chef tax collector of the empire. He made aregulated tax system and brought revenue to the government.22 However, Abd al-Rahman provided the same amount of income to Ogodei within one month. Ogodei thought that commerce would be more efficient so that he appointed Abd al-Rahman as the chef tax collector.23 After Ogodei, succeeding khans inherited this preference.2[4] Although Kublai was keen to depend on both Han Chinese and Semu people, he also encouraged commerce by promoting paper currency25 which improved the trading efficiency and increased government revenue by collecting a large amount of tax26

The prosperity derived from trade helped Semu merchants gain the reliance of Kublai and became important officials in Kublai’s government. However, Han officials opposed commerce and trade. Han people’s opposition to commerce was partly because of tradition. From the time of Liu Che, or Han Wu Di, Confucianism has been the dominant ideology of the Chinese government and officials. Therefore, Han Chinese officials took Confucius’ thoughts as the standard to manage the nation. In Confucius’ ideology, commerce was in a very low position. He once said that “a gentleman cares about moral principles, while a villain cares about profits.”27 Consequently, it was not a surprise for Kublai to see his Han Chinese officials strongly opposing to support trades. Admittedly, the Song Dynasty was a time when commerce was highly developed in China, However, Chinese merchants could not step into the government and Han Chinese officials did not favor commerce at all. In contrast, Semu officials came from territories near the Silk Road so that they had mastered the skill of making trades. Also, their religion, Islam encouraged that. The Koran said that “merchants are messengers of the world and reliable servants of Allah in the Earth.”28 Not surprisingly, divergence and conflict emerged between these two groups. As Juan Ma has argued“the conflict was due to traditional difference in essence, and Kublai had to rely on Semu officials more because had to encourage commerce.”29[5] Therefore, Kublai did not appoint Han people to important positions in his government due to their opposition to commerce and trade.30

  1. Kublai’s fear of Han Chinese rebellion

Besides Kublai’s desire to encourage commerce, his fear of Han Chinese rebellion was also an important reason to stop him from trusting Han Chinese officials.

In the early stages of Kublai’s reign, Han Chinese people were dominant in the government. In fact, 60% of all officials in the government were Han Chinese.31 Kublai also tried to win common Han Chinese people’s support by showing that he was willing to learn Chinese culture though he came from a nomadic tribe on the grassland. His imperial edict of inauguration read that he would “follow the orthodox origin made by Spring and Autumn Annuals and conform to the moral concerns described in Yi.”32 Spring and Autumn Annuals and Yi are both ancient books which had become cultural symbols by the time of Kublai. In saying that he would follow the ideologies of these books, he hoped to get the support of Han people. However, the support he got did not reach his expectation. Therefore, he started to worry about Han Chinese rebellions.33 That was the reason why Kublai became so conservative after Wentong Wang was accused of participating in the rebellion.

Wang was an important official. He was appointed by Kublai as pingzhangzhengshi (a senior official responsible for political and military affairs).34 Wang also promoted Confucianism and made great contributions to the empire. As well as collecting and transporting a number of materials and weapons from the Central Plain, Wang effectively supporting Kublai in the battle against Ariq-Boke, Kublai’s rebellious younger brother. These contributions were significant to the establishment and solidification of Yuan government.35 Kublai was not able to receive the fact that such a loyal official rebelled against him. After this, Kublai Khan reduced his trust in high-ranking Han officials. After this year, Kublai did not allow Han Chinese to be appointed as pingzhangzhengshi as well as to positions that were in higher rankings, and this rule was followed by Kublai’s successors.36 Some depressed Han officials complained that “since the first year of Kublai’s governance, countless scholars and masters have been recognized and worked for the government! But from the fifth year, Kublai has been stupid not to trust these talents.”37 Obviously, the distrust of Kublai was a significant strike to Han Chinese scholars.

At the same time, Kublai promoted a“four scale hierarchy system” which emerged before his reign. Under this hierarchy system, people were divided into Mongols, Semu people, Hanren (northern Han Chinese and other ethnic groups such as Jurchen, Tangut, and Khitan), Nanren (southern Han Chinese). It is widely agreed by historians that the purpose of this hierarchy system was to emphasis the priority of Mongolians and suppress subject ethnic groups. Han Chinese, the most populous ethnic group under the governance of Kublai, were at the bottom of the hierarchy system. Basically, Kublai’s goal was to control Han Chinese and prevent them from forming rebellions.In Kublai’s government, the rule of positions that officials could be appointed as was not strict but still tightly depended on the hierarchy system. Mongols and Semu people could assume the office of prime minister, pingzhangzhengshi, and positions between these two. Han Chinese, according to the rule made by Kublai earlier, were exc[6]luded from these senior positions. Therefore, although the number of Han Chinese officials was not less than the one of Mongol and Semu officials, Han Chinese could only find jobs in low-level positions, and they were not qualified to hold positions related to policy making. Under the restriction of rule implemented by Kublai, Han Chinese hardly became important officials.

Conclusion

Although promoting pro-Chinese policies and building up Han government structure, Kublai remained conservative and skeptical in appointing Han Chinese officials in his reign. This research has filled the blank of research of Han Chinese officials in Kublai Khan’s period. However, there is still room for improvement in this paper. The most important thing to improve is that this paper mainly uses Chinese resources, but the perspective provided by scholars and historians in other countries is lacking. Therefore, further research is needed by scholars using the Yuan Shi and Persian sources, including Jami al-Tawarikh, to come up with a better analysis of Mongol ethnic policy.

WORKS CITED:

1Rossabi, Morris. Kublai Khan, His Life and Times . Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009.

2Zhou,Liangxiao.History of Yuan.Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020.

3 Timothy, May.The Mongol Conquests in World History.London:Reaktion Books. 2012.

4 Turchin, Peter. “A Theory for Formation”, Journal of Global History, no.4(2009): 191-217

5Xiao,Qiqing.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo .Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018.

6 Zhou,Liangxiao.History of Yuan.Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020.

7 ibid 4.

8 Xiao,Qiqing.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo .Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018.

9Xiao, Qiqing. Mid-Yuan Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University,2008.

10 ibid 491.

11Song,Lian.Yuan Shi .vol.81.

12 ibid 2017.

13 Three poems to Song Demao-the second, Series of Gentleman Zhanran, Vol.9.

14 Zhou,Liangxiao.History of Yuan.Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020.

15 Yao,Dali.Political Institutions and Culture in Yuan China .Beijing:Beijing University Press,2011.

16Xiao,Qiqing.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo .Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018.

17 Song,Lian.Yuan Shi .vol.18 382.

18 Su, Tianjue.Yuanwenlei, vol.57.

19 Xiao,Qiqing.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo .Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018.

20 Zhu,Tingyao. On the Change of Kublais Policy. Beijing: Renmin Press, 2008.

21 ibid 91.

22Su, Tianjue.Yuanwenlei vol.57.

23 Song,Lian.Yuan Shi . Vol.2, p.36.

24 Song,Lian.Yuan Shi . vol.18, p382.

25 Polo,Marco. Travels of Marco Polo, Marco Polo. Beijing: Renmin Press, 2016.

26 Song,Lian.Yuan Shi . vol.94, p2398.

27 the Analects of Confucius, vol.Liren.

28 Koran, 11:85.

29 Ma, Juan. “The Conflicts between Islam and Confucianism during the Mongolian Empire and Yuan Dynasty.”Journal of Yuan History 32, no.3(2020):7-14.

30 Zhou,liangxiao.History of Yuan.Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020.

31Xiao,Qiqing.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo .Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018

32 Song,Lian.Yuan Shi . vol.4, p65.

33 Zhou,Liangxiao.History of Yuan.Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020.

34 Song,Lian.Yuan Shi . vol.4, p63.

35Ouyang, Chen. After the book of Yuan Shi. Wang Wentong. Shanghai: Shanghai Press, 2007.

36 Song,Lian.Yuan Shi .ZhongHua,Press ,vol.112, p2789-2832.

37 Xiao,Qiqing.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo .Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018.


[1] Morris, Rossabi. Kublai Khan, His Life and Times ( Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 233-319.

2 Liangxiao Zhou.History of Yuan.(Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020), 56.

3 May Timothy.The Mongol Conquests in World History (London:Reaktion Books. 2012) 12.

4 Peter Turchin. “A Theory for Formation”, Journal of Global History, no.4(2009): 191-217

5 Qiqing Xiao.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo (Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018) ,26.

6 Liangxiao Zhou.History of Yuan(Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020) 16.

7 ibid 4

8 Qiqing Xiao.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo (Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018) ,466.

9 Xiao, Qiqing. Mid-Yuan Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University,2008) 491.

10 ibid 491

11Yuan Shi vol.81 2017

12 ibid 2017

13 Three poems to Song Demao-the second, Series of Gentleman Zhanran, Vol.9

14 Liangxiao Zhou.History of Yuan(Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020) 632

15 Political Institutions and Culture in Yuan China 259

16 Qiqing Xiao.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo (Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018) ,45

17 Yuan Shi vol.18 382

 

18 Yuanwenlei, vol.57, Zhongshuling Yelugong shendaobei

19 Qiqing Xiao.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo (Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018) ,38.

20 Tingyao Zhu. On the Change of Kublais Policy.( Beijing: Renmin Press, 2008) 77.

21 ibid 91.

22 Yuanwenlei vol.57 Zhongshuling Yelugong shendaobei.

23Yuan Shi, Vol.2, p.36.

24 Yuan Shi, vol.18 p382.

 

25 Marco Polo. Travels of Marco Polo, Marco Polo. (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2016), 108.

26 Yuan Shi, vol.94, p2398.

27 the Analects of Confucius, vol.Liren.

28 Koran, 11:85.

29 Juan Ma. “The Conflicts between Islam and Confucianism during the Mongolian Empire and Yuan Dynasty,”Journal of Yuan History 32, no.3(2020):7-14.

30 Liangxiao Zhou.History of Yuan.(Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020), 124.

31 Qiqing Xiao.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo (Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018) ,493

32 Yuan Shi, vol.4, p65.

33 Liangxiao Zhou.History of Yuan.(Shanghai:Shanghai Renmin Press,2020), 294.

34Yuan Shi, vol.4, p63.

35 Chen Ouyang. After the book of Yuan Shi. Wang Wentong. (Shanghai: Shanghai Press, 2007), 36.

36Yuan Shi, vol.112, p2789-2832.

37 Qiqing Xiao.Nei Beiguo Er Wai Zhonguo (Beijing:Zhonghua Press,2018) ,169.

15 Comments

  1. 巴特尔

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    忽必烈确实深受汉文化熏陶,因为他当时被任命为漠南蒙古的统帅,长期驻扎在漠南。从推行汉化到进展缓慢甚至停滞,有其综合原因,但最主要的原因,正如作者阐述的,是不同民族之间的信任问题。

    • 巴特尔

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      不同民族之间的信任度,在某阶段会较低,随着民族融合的进展会不断提升或随着民族分裂而走向敌对。
      世界多民族(种族)大团结应该是人类共同的追求。

  2. 巴特尔

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    王文统,字以道,益都人也。少时读权谋书,好以言撼人。遍干诸侯,无所遇,乃往见李鋋。鋋与语,大喜,即留置幕府,命其子彦简师事之,文统亦以女妻鋋。由是军旅之事,咸与谘决,岁上边功,虚张敌势,以固其位,用官物树私恩,取宋涟、海二郡,皆文统谋也。

  3. 巴特尔

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    世祖在潜藩,访问才智之士,素闻其名。及即位,厉精求治,有以文统为荐者,亟召用之。乃立中书省,以总内外百司之政,首擢文统为平章政事,委以更张庶务。建元为中统,诏谕天下,立十路宣抚司,示以条格,欲差发办而民不扰,盐课不失常额,交钞无致阻滞。寻诏行中书省造中统元宝交钞,立互市于颍州、涟水、光化军。是年冬,初行中统交钞,自十文至二贯文,凡十等,不限年月,诸路通行,税赋并听收受。

  4. 巴特尔

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    明年二月,世祖在开平,召行中书省事祃祃与文统,亲率各路宣抚使俱赴阙。世祖自去秋亲征叛王阿里不哥于北方,凡民间差发、宣课盐铁等事,一委文统等裁处。及振旅还宫,未知其可否何若,且以往者急于用兵,事多不暇讲究,所当振其纪纲者,宜在今日。故召文统等至,责以成效,用游显、郑鼎、赵良弼、董文炳等为各路宣抚司,复以所议条格诏谕各路,俾遵行之。未几,又诏谕宣抚司,并达鲁花赤管民官、课税所官,申严私盐、酒醋、曲货等禁。

  5. 巴特尔

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    文统为人忌刻,初立中书时,张文谦为左丞。文谦素以安国利民自负,故凡讲论建明,辄相可否,文统积不能平,思有以陷之,文谦竟以本职行大名等路宣抚司事而去。时姚枢、窦默、许衡,皆世祖所敬信者,文统讽世祖授枢为太子太师,默为太子太傅,衡为太子太保,外佯尊之,实不欲使朝夕备顾问于左右也。默尝与王鹗及枢、衡俱侍世祖,面诋文统曰:“此人学术不正,必祸天下,不可处以相位。”世祖曰:“若是,则谁可为者?”默以许衡对,世祖不怿而罢。鹗尝请以右丞相史天泽监修国史,左丞相耶律铸监修《辽史》,文统监修《金史》。世祖曰:“监修阶衔,俟修史时定之。”

  6. 巴特尔

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    又明年二月,李鋋反,以涟、海三城献于宋。先是,其子彦简,由京师逃归,鋋遣人白之中书。及反书闻,人多言文统尝遣子荛与鋋通音耗。世祖召文统问之曰:“汝教鋋为逆,积有岁年,举世皆知之。朕今问汝所策云何,其悉以对。”文统对曰:“臣亦忘之,容臣悉书以上。”书毕,世祖命读之,其间有曰:“蝼蚁之命,苟能存全,保为陛下取江南。”世祖曰:“汝今日犹欲缓颊于朕耶?”会鋋遣人持文统三书自洺水至,以书示之,文统始错愕骇汗。书中有“期甲子”语,世祖曰:“甲子之期云何?”文统对曰:“李鋋久蓄反心,以臣居中,不敢即发,臣欲告陛下缚鋋久矣,第缘陛下加兵北方,犹未靖也。比至甲子,犹可数年,臣为是言,姑迟其反期耳。”世祖曰:“无多言。朕拔汝布衣,授之政柄,遇汝不薄,何负而为此?”文统犹枝辞傍说,终不自言“臣罪当死”,乃命左右斥去,始出就缚。犹召窦默、姚枢、王鹗、僧子聪及张柔等至,示以前书曰:“汝等谓文统当得何罪?”文臣皆言“人臣无将,将而必诛”。柔独疾声大言曰:“宜剐!”世祖又曰:“汝同辞言之。”诸臣皆曰:“当死。”世祖曰:“渠亦自服朕前矣。”

  7. 巴特尔

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    文统乃伏诛。子荛并就戮。诏谕天下曰:“人臣无将,垂千古之彝训;国制有定,怀二心者必诛。何期辅弼之僚,乃蓄奸邪之志。平章政事王文统,起由下列,擢置台司,倚付不为不深,待遇不为不厚,庶收成效,以底丕平。焉知李鋋之同谋,潜使子荛之通耗。迩者获亲书之数幅,审其有反状者累年,宜加肆市之诛,以著滔天之恶。已于今月二十三日,将反臣王文统并其子荛,正典刑讫。於戏!负国恩而谋大逆,死有余辜;处相位而被极刑,时或未喻。咨尔有众,体予至怀。”然文统虽以反诛,而元之立国,其规模法度,世谓出于文统之功为多云。

    • 巴特尔

      回复

      文统虽以反诛,而元之立国,其规模法度,世谓出于文统之功为多——还是很有能力的。

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